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Abstract 
 
Unlike letting the Ultimatum Game be played in the strategy mode with monotonic response strategy, 
both players, the proposer as well as the responder, are allowed to concede. Proposers would concede by 
increasing second, third, … binding offers. Similarly, responders concede by decreasing binding 
acceptance thresholds. 
Treatments differ in whether to avoid early conflict at least one party must concede. The other condition 
varies the number of  possible concessions, namely, two versus four. Since accepting every positive (last) 
offer is weakly undominated, the benchmark outcome is the usual one with the smallest positive offer 
accepted (at least in last attempt). If  concessions are necessary, the responder might prefer larger early 
acceptance thresholds allowing him to concede. Similarly, a proposer might begin by offering much less 
than what she is finally willing to concede. 
Our experimental findings confirm the hypothesis of  more frequent and larger concessions by responder 
participants for whom the concessions are hypothetical and essentially mean to rely on weakly dominant 
behavior. According to our data, the need of  concessions weakens the power advantage of  the proposer. 
Surprisingly, the longer horizon does not improve the chances of  an agreement, even when no 
concessions are needed. 
JEL Classification: C72, C78 
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1. Introduction 
In his classic book on “the art and science of  negotiation” Howard Raiffa (1982) argues that “…Bargainers are 
continually asked during negotiations whether they prefer one constellation of  outcomes to another … Not only must they decide what 
they ultimately want, but they also determine what they would be willing to give up in order to achieve their goal…” (p. 148). In 
this respect, concession is the hidden side of  bargaining, since parties must try to conceal -at best- how far would they 
go in the direction of  their counterpart in order to reach an agreement.  
Sometimes, these concession dynamics unravel through the sequence of  offers and counteroffers that 
characterize sequential bargaining, whether it takes place in wage settlements (Becker, 1987) or in Maroccan 
bazars (Lamieri e Bertacchini, 2006). However, dynamic bargaining gives only a partial description of  the 
concession dynamics: when the recipient accepts (or rejects) an offer, the proposer will never knows how far he 
should have pushed (or pulled) to get a better trade (or to close a deal that eventually broke down).  
Put differently, the concession dynamics is based on counterfactuals, which are poorly described by the mere 
observation of  the bargaining outcomes. This paper is based on an experiment in which subjects are explicitly asked 
for their concession dynamics in the normal form. This gives us a finer insight into the players' decision process when 
feedback information in a bargaining process is either unavailable or difficult to get. 
To this aim, we follow the methodological approach of  Alberti et al. (2014) for the context of  the Nash 
Demand Game by enriching the dimensionality of  the choice set and, thereby, the possibilities to infer possibly 
conflicting motives in ultimatum-like bargaining situations (see Güth and Kocher, 2014, for a recent survey). 
Assuming a normal form -or static- negotiation framework players, proposer and responder, do not choose just 
one offer, respectively acceptance threshold but, when first attempts fail, can concede by offering more, 
respectively accepting less in further attempts. For half  of  the treatments, in line with many bargaining protocols, 
no concession results in conflict whereas further attempts to find an agreement are possible when at least one 
party concedes after a failed attempt. For the other half  conflict results only when even the last agreement 
attempt fails. 
In collective wage bargaining, a round with no concession by any party would usually imply a strike what 
might be captured by a decreasing pie size where, however, most bargaining protocols assume alternating offers 
bargaining (e.g. Ståhl, 1972; Rubinstein, 1982). If  the pie size shrinks to 0 after no concession, this would 
resemble one of  our conditions. In international negotiations, like those to fight global warming, parties cannot 
meet very often (the first Kyoto-protocol dates from 1992, the second from 1997); in case of  no concessions 
one often drops the issue, what corresponds to an “early conflict” in the condition where concessions are 
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needed. In legally regulated disputes no concession could mean that the judge determines a settlement what 
could be costly for all parties involved, similar to what will be called here “early conflict”. 
Compared to usual theoretical and experimental studies of  concession bargaining in the tradition of  Zeuthen 
(1930), the main innovative aspect of  this paper is the asymmetric ultimatum framework. Especially, 
• there can be no anti-conflict with both parties demanding and getting together less than available;  
• the responder states only what he minimally requires for himself  (and, therefore, her decision is only 
binding with respect to the likelihood of  an agreement being reached, not her final payoff  in case of  
agreement), so that each concession brings him closer to the solution strategy; 
• the proposer might have to pay dearly  for what he concedes. 
Does this suggest more concessions by responder than proposer participants? Will conceding responders 
initially not even accept the equal split? Do proposer participants begin with meager offers, hoping for a 
“sucker”? Will more experienced participants delay agreement to later attempts and avoid conflict more often? 
And, finally, will experience effects mainly apply to responder participants? We predict more frequent and larger 
concessions mainly from participants with greedy first requests and those in the role of  responders. Our 
multidimensional choice format helps to answer the questions raised above and to infer different motives to 
possibly categorize proposer and responder participants. In addition, we also link behavior to individual 
characteristics, distilled from the debriefing questionnaire answered after the experiment.  
Let us already indicate here some of  our findings: if  concessions are needed, agreement does not become 
more likely for the longer horizon; experience renders conflict less probable across all conditions; and proposers 
are asking for more and conceding less than responders, again across all conditions. We also compare our results 
with those of  symmetric concession making (Alberti et al. 2014), as well as to the outcomes of  usual ultimatum 
experiments.  Across all conditions we confirm a slightly advantage of  proposer participants and, as a result of  1
concession ultimatum bargaining, high agreement ratios. 
Section 2 introduces the “Concession Ultimatum Game” (CUG), whose solution outcome also predicts 
exploitation and does not question the large multiplicity of  equilibrium outcomes in ultimatum games. Section 3 
describes the experimental protocol and the four conditions differing in (no) need of  conceding and in the 
number of  concession stages, 2 vs 4. Section 4 is devoted to the statistical analysis of  our data. Section 5 
concludes by comparing our main results to other studies of  concession and ultimatum bargaining. Appendices 
 Restricting ourselves to the comparable data of  Binmore et al. (2002). 1
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contain supplementary information on the debriefing questionnaire and translated versions of  the experimental 
instructions.  
2. The Concession Ultimatum Game (CUG) 
Let X and Y denote the proposer, respectively, the responder. The positive monetary amount, p, i.e., the “pie” 
is what X and Y can share. The proposer chooses an offer profile with for all whereas the responder determines 
an acceptance profile with for all . The latter, , means that, on trial t, responder Y would accept an offer  only  if  , 
i.e., the components of   are acceptance thresholds.  
The last attempt, T, is applied when no earlier attempt leads to an agreement and, depending on the 
condition, when conceding prevents early conflict. More specifically, an agreement is reached in trial  when, for 
all [≤T], it holds that  and, again depending on the condition, when at least one party concedes after each round 
t, and when   , i.e. Y accepts via  the offer  of  X  in round t*. 
In case of  such an agreement, X earns  and Y receives , the amount offered to him by X. Thus, any 
agreement satisfies , i.e. anticonflict in the sense of  agreeing to share less than is impossible.  If  no agreement is 
reached within the (time) horizon, T, the play ends in disagreement with monetary payoff  of  0 for both players.  
3 Experimental design  
3.1. Sessions 
We ran 9 sessions at the Laboratory of  the Max Planck Institute in Jena. A total of  280 students (8 sessions 
with 32 participants each plus one session with 24) were recruited among the undergraduate population of  Jena 
University using Orsee (Greiner, 2004). Subjects were provided with a hardcopy of  the instructions, which were 
read aloud by the experimental proctor, the same for all sessions.  Some control questions and a dry round 2
preceded the “real” experiment, in which subjects played 30 rounds of  two variants of  CUG, to be described in 
the following section. 
3.2 Treatments 
We analyze within-subjects T=3 and T=5, but vary between subjects the sequence: participants either 
confront T=3 first, then T=5, the 3→5 sequence, or the reverse 5→3 sequence. The other distinction between  
 The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). 2
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• no concessions needed to prevent early conflict,  N-condition, or 
• not conceding after failed attempt yields negotiation breakdown, C-condition,  
is implemented between subjects (152 vs. 128 subjects, respectively). Table 1 represents the 2x2 factorial design. 
Tab. 1. The 2x2 factorial between-subject design. Number of  sessions and subjects per treatment within brackets.  
We refer to and as treatments; to (N, T=3), (N, T=5), (C, T=3) and (C, T=5) as conditions, with T=3,5 
identifying a T-game. When facing a given time horizon, T{3,5}, participants played this T-game for 15 rounds with 
randomly changing partners and outcome feedback after each round. Varying T only within subjects was based 
on the conjecture –confirmed by our evidence- that it hardly matters- at least in the latter of  the 15 rounds with 
the same horizon Tϵ{3,5}- whether one first encounters the longer or the shorter horizon.  3
We actually are able to pool the data for some statistical tests. Compared to this we expected and confirmed 
strong effects of  condition N, respectively C for concession making and bargaining results and have therefore 
explored those conditions between subjects. 
Feedback information has been restricted to outcomes. Specifically, participants were told: 
• which, if  any, attempt t=1,…,T was decisive for yielding an agreement or, if  not that, only in the C-
treatments, after which failed attempt t=1, .., T  early conflict was the outcome. In N-treatments 
conflict results only after a failed last attempt. 
• in case of  agreement, the accepted offer and how much each partner had earned. 
The second phase of  15 rounds was announced afresh after the end of  the first phase. Only then, subjects 
were given the instructions for the second phase.  4
3.3. Matching  
At the beginning of  a session, the software would partition the subject pool in matching groups of  8 subjects -4 
X and 4 Y- with subjects interacting only with participants of  the same matching group across the entire 
T-sequence
Concessions needed?
N(o) C
3->5 N3->5 (3 , 88) C3->5 (2 , 64)
5->3 N5->3  (2 , 64) C5->3 (2 , 64)
 All regressions reported in this paper always include a sequence dummy, which is never significant and, therefore, not reported (but 3
controlled for).
 See the Appendix B for a translation of  the German instructions. 4
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experiment. Role and matching group assignment was kept constant throughout the session. Across periods, 
participants were randomly rematched within the same matching group to form pairs of  X and Y participants. 
Participants were not told that random re-matching was restricted to smaller matching groups, to discourage 
repeated-game effects. 
3.4. Feed-back 
At the end of  each round participants were informed about:  
1. Whether an agreement has been reached;  
2. If  so, at which trial; and if  not, in the C treatment, which trial led to conflict due to no party conceding. 
3. All offers from X leading to the result;  
4. The monetary earnings of  both participants, X and Y, in that period.   
By contrast, Y’s acceptance profile was not made public to X at any time (to limit the effect of  using monotonic 
response strategies) what anyhow would be unrealistic –an acceptance threshold specifies behavior 
hypothetically. 
3.4. Payment 
The monetary pie, p, was always € 11. Proposers’ and responders’ admissible offers/acceptance thresholds 
were restricted to integer numbers, thus excluding, by design, the equal split and imposing a quite substantial minimum 
size for concessions. In addition to the show-up fee of  € 4, participants were paid for two randomly selected 
rounds for each of  the two phases. Subjects were paid in cash privately at the end of  the session. An 
experimental session, including the debriefing questionnaire and the payment phase, lasted approximately 2 
hours. On average participants earned € 28 (min €14, max € 37). 
3.5. Debriefing 
To collect information about the heterogeneity in the subject pool participants answered a debriefing 
questionnaire at the end of  a session. In addition to standard socio-demographic variables (gender, age, field of  
study, parents’ education, family wealth and available income, etc…) the questionnaire also includes two classic 
psychological tests: i) Frederick’s (2005) Cognitive Reflection Test and ii) a 25-item reduced version of  the Big Five 
personality inventory (John and Srivastava, 1999), which is designed to elicit five stereotypical psychological traits 
(see Appendix A for more details). We implemented ii) as a control to be used in case of  unusual findings and 
thereby focus mainly on i). 
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3.6. Hypotheses 
The rich database, hopefully, will yield clear results concerning the learning direction of  the following 
dimensions:   
a) the (non) agreement frequencies;  
b) whether agreements converge more to equal splits (evolution of  fair play) or meager offers 
(evolution of  rational play);   
c) whether the heterogeneity in behavior and outcomes is reduced by experience;  
d) whether agreements are more and more delayed;  
e) whether dependence on condition becomes weaker across rounds. 
Our main hypothesis that greedy first attempts go along with larger concessions and that responders concede 
more often and larger amounts partly addresses individual heterogeneity and partly the asymmetry of  the game, 
a novel aspect compared to other concession-making studies. Whereas for responder Y a concession means to 
give up one monotonic acceptance strategy for one which weakly dominates it, proposer X loses when increasing 
his offer. We thus predict that the burden of  conceding is significantly more often shared by Y – than by X – 
participants.  
Another interesting aspect is whether the fairness norm is so strong that at least pairs agreeing on the fifty-
fifty split can do so without much delay and haggling. On the other hand, the possibility and partly the need of  
concessions may induce some participants to begin with rather ambitious claims in order to be later on able to 
concede.  A fair participant, for example, in the proposer role might fear: 
“Imagine that I as proposer X immediately offer  what, however, due to   is rejected. Even if  now the responder concedes but not 
enough to reach an agreement: wouldn't (s)he expect me to concede next? But I can't offer Y more than half  of  the pie!” 
At least in the C-treatments such reasoning seems rather likely which is why we predict more ambitious first 
choices for C-treatments than for N-treatments. 
More basically, conflicting intuitions on how to behave in CUG-experiments might gain momentum in 
repeated play like: 
• the symmetric characteristic function of  the CUG suggesting equal sharing; 
• the asymmetric power structure not  reflected by the symmetric characteristic function but revealed 
by backward induction reasoning suggesting exploitation of  Y; 
• the basic intuition that concession bargaining asks for haggling hoping to find a “sucker” and 
• fairness concerns since roles are randomly assigned and the pie is given to X and Y like “manna from 
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heaven” what questions entitlement and exploiting strategic advantages. 
If  one surprising effect of  ultimatum experiment was the motivational complexity of  ultimatum bargaining 
(see the recent survey by Güth and Kocher, 2014), CUG-experiments could enrich this much further. 
4. Results 
Regarding the 280 participants (177 female, 63.2%; mean age ± SD: 24.3±3 years; age range 19-35 years); 
mostly, undergraduates from the University of  Jena student population (26% from Natural Science, 50% from 
Social Science and 23% from Humanities), we find no specific correlation between socio-demographic 
characteristics and treatment assignment.  5
4.1. Agreement ratios and dynamics 
We begin by looking at outcome distributions. Outcomes, basically, depend on whether and, if  so, which 
agreement is reached and, if  not, whether this is due to the fact that the time horizon, T, has been reached 
without an agreement or whether, in C-treatments, neither party concedes within trials.  
Figure 1 replicates Figure 1 in Alberti et al. (2014), Panel A, by reporting the “box plots” representing the 
distribution of  acceptance rates across matching groups in the four conditions.    6
!  
Fig. 1. Box plots of  agreement ratios by condition. 
Agreements are more frequent in N treatments (with negligible differences across horizon, T). The different 
 Correlation tables are not reported here but available upon request.5
 The boxes show 50% of  the total observations (from the 25% to the 75% percentile). Adjacent lines trace the first upper and lower 6
adjacent values, while points denote outliers. The line within the box denotes the median.
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results of  the C-treatment, are i) lower average agreement rates, ii) especially for T=5. Mann-Whitney non 
parametric tests on the differences of  matching group agreement rate averages confirm 
Result 1. The difference in agreement rates between N and C treatments is always significant (at 5% confidence 
level), whether or not one conditions on a specific horizon, T. By contrast, the difference in agreement rates between 
T=3 and T=5 is never significant, regardless on whether or not one conditions on concession protocol, N and C.  
Figure 2 details the disagreement patterns, separately for each condition. 
  
Fig. 2. Agreement shares by condition.   
Across all conditions, agreement is by far the most common outcome, over 90% of  all observations. Also 
notice that i) the agreement ratio is higher for N (left T-columns in Figure 2), while, ii) conditional on a given 
concession rule, time horizons T (compare lower and upper panels of  Figure 2) do not affect the likelihood of  
an agreement. Another interesting finding is that, in case of  C-treatments, “early conflict” for T=3 is not more 
frequent than for T=5, in spite of  the twice as many possible opportunities for “no concession”. Table 2 reports 
results of  testing mean differences in conflict type, –evaluated at matching group level- across time horizons and 
concession requirements using Mann-Whitney tests,  what supports  7
Result 2. In the C condition, the way of  disagreeing (no concession vs. deadline) crucially depends on the time 
horizon, with lower (higher) relative frequency of  No Concession (Deadline Reached) conflict when T=3 (T=5), 
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
N C N C
T=3 T=5
Agreement Deadline Reached
No Concession
 All test statistics reported in this paper follow exactly the same methodology. 7
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respectively.  
Tab. 2. Testing mean differences in conflict types (Mann-Whitney test, 2-tailed). “X” denotes non-applicable cells. 
We now take a closer look at the agreement dynamics across trials, that is, within a single round. Figure 3 
summarizes the within-trial agreement dynamics by reporting relative frequencies of  agreements disaggregated 
by trials. Here we see that, for both T-games, condition C yields a smaller relative frequency of  agreements in the 
first trial . Conditional on an agreement being reached (i.e., excluding observations ending in conflict), average 
agreement trials t*=1,…,T are significantly higher in condition C (Mann-Whitney tests reject the null at less than 
1% confidence for both T=3 and T=5). 
  
Fig. 3. Agreement dynamics across trials.  
Apparently, players anticipate that, in condition C, they will have to concede more often and start off  more 
aggressively.  
Result 3. Conditional on reaching an agreement, the need to concede in order to avoid early conflict significantly increases 
the number of  trials till agreeing. 
We now look at the agreement dynamics across rounds. Table 3 reports the estimated coefficients of  (ordered) 
Ratio of  No Concession Conflict Ratio of  Deadline Reached Conflict
Mean Mean
Protocol T=3 T=5 p-value T=3 T=5 p-value
N X X X .056 .057 .89
C .03 .08 .0006 .082 .05 .031
Both X X X .068 .054 .214
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logit regressions in which we regress the probability of  an agreement (in agreement trial, t*) against a round 
index, r, and condition dummies.  8
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Tab. 3.  Regressions of  agreement dynamics. 
As Table 3 shows, condition C delays the agreement, and we also observe evidence of  learning, as reported in 
the following  
Result 4. Agreement is more likely in the N sessions, and in later rounds. C sessions are characterized by later 
agreements. 
4.2. Inequality 
Figure 4 replicates Figure 1 in Alberti et al. (2014), Panel B, by reporting the box plots representing the 
distributions of  the relative share for X, conditional of  an agreement being reached, in the four conditions. 
ALL DATA N-condition C-condition
Agreement Agreement trial t* Agreement Agreement trial t* Agreement Agreement trial t*
C condition -0.862*** 0.654***
(0.177) (0.204)
T=5 -0.152 3.240*** -0.0330 2.498*** -0.222 4.784***
(0.119) (0.331) (0.227) (0.343) (0.138) (0.409)
round r 0.0669*** 0.0267*** 0.0957*** 0.0103 0.0507*** 0.0600***
(0.0137) (0.00761) (0.0245) (0.00843) (0.0164) (0.0112)
Constant 2.395*** 1.963*** 1.783***
(0.204) (0.267) (0.198)
Obs. 8,400 7,662 4,560 4,300 3,840 3,362
 In the regressions of  Table 3 –as well as in all regressions reported in this paper- we controlled for the existence of  order effects, since 8
both T-games where administered within subjects, in different order (see Table 1). In this respect, order effects were never significant and 
we omit to report them. 
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 !  
  Fig. 4. Distributions of  X’s relative share, conditional of  agreement being reached.  
Proposers exploit their bargaining power: the relative pie shares of  X usually are above half  of  the pie in all 
conditions. Thus ultimatum power pays in agreement what, however, is limited and never yields more than 60% 
of  p. Comparing across concession protocols, the ultimatum power advantage seems more pronounced in 
condition N: the need to concede mitigates X’s ultimatum power and, thereby, raises Y´s relative share. 
Table 4 reports the estimated coefficients of  random-effect tobit regressions in which the dependent variable 
is , the pie share the proposer gets in case of  an agreement being reached in round r, as a function of  the 
negotiation round, r, and condition dummies. We run three separate regressions: one for all observations, 
including a concession dummy, then two additional regressions, conditioning on the concession protocols.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Tab. 4. Regressing proposers’ relative share in case of  agreement, (p- yt*)/p with p=€11. 
ALL N C
VARIABLES myShare myShare myShare
C-condition -0.0138***
(0.00484)
T=5 0.00230* 0.00170 0.00308
(0.00125) (0.00148) (0.00214)
Round r 0.000125 0.000316* -0.000123
(0.000145) (0.000171) (0.000248)
Constant 0.543*** 0.542*** 0.531***
(0.00353) (0.00340) (0.00449)
Observations 3,831 2,150 1,681
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The estimated coefficients of  Table 4 justify  
Result 5. Even when controlling for conditions, the effect of  ultimatum power on proposer X´s agreement share is 
significant. However, in C, the advantage of  X is significantly reduced. Inequality does not depend on experience, 
measured by round (r =1,…,15) nor on sequence, and . 
4.4. Individual behavior 
We now look at individual behavior along two complementary dimensions: initial aggreessivness and willingness to 
concede. Figure 5 reports mean offers/acceptance thresholds across trials, disaggregated by condition, showing 
that C parties start off  with more aggressive claims and concede more across trials.  
     
Fig. 5. Mean offers/minimum acceptable offers across trials, disaggregated by treatment  
Furthermore, in condition C mean offers/thresholds movements follow a nearly linear trend (choices were 
restricted to integer numbers), whereas in N the already smaller gap between claims is more rapidly reduced in 
the last trial than before.  
Mann-Whitney tests always reject the null (always at less than 1% confidence) that i) first/last demands are 
equal across player roles, ii) first are equal to last demands and iii) across trials, proposers concede as much as 
responders. Proposers are more aggressive in their claims, both at the first and at the latest trial, and conceding is 
a consistent pattern, also in N, with- as expected- responders conceding more than proposers. In all conditions 
differences are always statistically significant at 5% confidence level with the exception of  C, T=5. To 
summarize, we could largely confirm our theoretical conjectures: concessions are larger in C with proposers 
conceding less than responders (except for  C, T=5).  
Result 6. Proposers demand more (and concede less) than responders, in all trials. In the C-protocol both parties 
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begin with more aggressive claims and concede more.   
After discovering that the heterogeneity in first demands and concession rates has a clear treatment -and 
player role- component, we became also interested in identifying (if  any) an individual component, once treatment 
conditions have been controlled for. Figure 6 plots, for each participant, average values of  initial demands 
(Demand1) and concessions rates, deltaDem, , ( for proposers (responders), respectively, by protocol and T-game.   
  
Fig. 6. First demands (Demand1) against concession rates (deltaDem), averaged by subject.  
As Figure 6 shows, on average, proposers demand more (and concede less) than responders. Moreover, 
Figure 6 also shows that initial demands and concession rates are highly correlated: those subjects who initially 
demand more, are also those who concede more. Put differently, individual behavior is highly heterogeneous, 
even after controlling for treatment conditions and player role.  
Motivated by the evidence of  Figure 6, we evaluate, for each subject, mean first demand and concessions 
across the entire experiment, and evaluate the median of  such individual mean values by player roles and C-
condition. We then partition our subject pool in four groups, depending on whether their initial demand 
(concession rate) is above the median of  their reference group (that is, among subjects with the same role and 
condition). Since first demands and concession rates are highly correlated, we jointly estimate the probability of  
belonging to either partition (hiDem1/loDem1, hideltaDem/lodeltaDem) using a bivariate probit regression, 
where the set of  regressors includes proxies of  subjects’ observed heterogeneity distilled from the questionnaire. 
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Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Tab 5. Bivariate probit regressions 
Our set of  covariates includes:  
1. female: gender dummy.  
2. RoomSizeRatio: a standard proxy for household wealth, obtained by dividing the number of  rooms of  
the main residence by the household size. 
3. GradePointAverage: academic performance.  
4. CRT score (see Appendix A).  
5. BIG_5_x. See Appendix A.   
The estimates in Table 5 show that the higher the CRT score the larger the likelihood of  stating an 
“aggressive” first demand and of  ending up making larger concessions. It also indicates that this behavior might 
be influenced by some personality traits such as Agreeableness and Conscientiousness and by gender with this 
latter effect being more prominent for proposers. 
The evidence of  Figure 6 and Table 5 yields the following  
ALL Proposers Responders
VARS. hi_Dem1 hi_delta hi_Dem1 hi_delta hi_Dem1 hi_delta
female -0.0249 0.226 0.304 0.529** -0.371 -0.196
(0.166) (0.168) (0.237) (0.239) (0.239) (0.252)
RSR 0.0320 0.0230 0.0440 0.0507 -0.0212 -0.113
(0.101) (0.101) (0.128) (0.131) (0.177) (0.183)
GPA 0.0357 0.0841 0.0675 0.0914 -0.0153 0.148
(0.112) (0.114) (0.148) (0.153) (0.188) (0.196)
CRT 0.159** 0.202*** 0.188* 0.0416 0.128 0.322***
(0.0687) (0.0691) (0.104) (0.105) (0.0957) (0.0992)
BIG5_Agree -0.735 -1.202 -0.845 -0.752 -0.915 -2.396**
(0.729) (0.734) (0.977) (1.012) (1.128) (1.161)
BIG5_Open 0.595 0.683 0.574 -2.470* 1.159 4.612***
(0.951) (0.959) (1.335) (1.346) (1.431) (1.539)
BIG5_Neuro -0.234 -1.464* -0.366 -0.604 -0.154 -2.798**
(0.867) (0.873) (1.374) (1.391) (1.178) (1.256)
Constant -0.231 0.504 -0.390 1.920 -0.113 -0.416
(0.847) (0.854) (1.195) (1.233) (1.262) (1.256)
Obs. 280 280 140 140 140 140
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Result 7. Responders concede more than proposers, even after controlling for the positive (negative) effects that C 
treatments (large T) have on concession rates. Reflective subjects demand and concede more, irrespective of  the role as 
proposer or responder. Female proposers concede more, while the BIG 5 psychological traits are significant by 
influencing behavior mainly of  responders.  
 In our view, Result 7 illustrates nicely that heterogeneity in strategic interactions will not only be caused by 
heterogeneity in preferences and beliefs but can be due to cognitive skills, specifically it seems that more 
thoroughly reflecting participants concede more often. We only used the CRT-data although other personality 
characteristics, e.g. the so called “Big Five”, also help to account for the heterogeneity in behavior and, quite in 
line with our intuition that responders will concede more and more often. We do not pay attention to them as 
well as to gender since our hypothesis and research question did not focus on such traits. We mainly confirm our 
intuition that those who rate higher on conscientiousness, i.e. those who are thorough, careful and vigilant, 
concede more. Similar results has been obtained by Ben-Ner et al. (2003) and Ponti and Rodriguez-Lara (2015), 
who explain Dictator giving by CRT scores and personality traits measures.  
5. Comparison across studies 
In this section we compare some of  our findings (US hereafter) with those of  Binmore et al. (2002, BIN02) 
and Alberti et al. (2014, ALB14), the former implementing (among other treatments) a straightforward 
Ultimatum Game with no concessions and the latter implementing (among other treatments), our C-game under 
the Nash Demand Game (with asymmetric outside options) protocol. Two dimensions will be under scrutiny: 
agreement rates and relative shares in case of  agreement. Specifically, our evidence collected in the N (C) 
condition, will be compared with that of  BIN02 (ALB14), respectively.  
5.1 Agreement ratios 
By analogy with Figure 1, Figure 7 compares the agreement rate distributions across datasets.  
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a)       b) 
Fig. 7. Agreement ratio by datasets. 
As Table 7 shows, difference in mean agreement rates between our data and those of  ALB14 are never 
significant (though we observe a higher dispersion across matching groups in the latter dataset), whereas BIN02 
is characterized by a smaller agreement rate, around 80% -against 91% and 86% overall in our data and those of  
ALB14, respectively. These differences are always significant at less than 1% confidence, whether we consider 
the full datasets, or we split it by T-games.  
5.2 Inequality 
We now move to the comparison of  relative inequality across studies (in case of  agreement). By analogy with 
Figure 4, Figure 8 reports the box plots of  the distributions of  X’s relative share in case of  agreement. Panel a) 
compares US with ALB14 (condition C); Panel B compares US with BIN02 (condition N).  
Let’s discuss the comparison with ALB14 first. As Figure 8, Panel a) shows, the relative share Player 1 gets is 
(significantly) lower, roughly, just below 50% of  the pie. Remember that ALB14 implements a Nash Demand 
Game, in which, in case of  agreement, players receive what they ask. So, here bargaining power can only be 
measured by the size of  the conflict payoff  (175 points for player 1 against 25 for player 2, with sharing a total 
of  650). As Panel a) clearly shows, the agreement share does not reflect such a huge difference in the 
opportunity cost of  the agreement, while the 50/50 split seems to act as social norm in ALB14 data: 47% (44%) 
of  the pie is what Player 1 (2) gets in case of  agreement.   9
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1
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US ALB14
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
1
US BIN02
 If  we consider the bargaining process in ALB14 over the surplus, once the sum of  the conflict payoffs has been subtracted, we see that, 9
in case of  agreement, Player 1 (2) gets 29% (58%) of  the pie. 
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a)       b) 
Fig. 8. Inequality in case of  agreement by datasets. 
Things change dramatically in the comparison with BIN02. As Figure 8, Panel b) shows, the prevailing 
sharing rule in case of  agreement is “2/3 to the proposer, 1/3 to the responder”, typical of  many Ultimatum 
Game experiments.    
Result 8. Agreement rates do not differ significantly between US and ALB14, while BIN02 is characterized by 
lower agreement rates. Similarly to ours, in ALB14 players share equally the surplus in case of  agreement (although 
the difference is statistically significant), while in BIN02 the proposer gets significantly more.  
Altogether, our Result 8 suggests that concession bargaining quite generally enhances equality seeking at least 
with finally agreeing or, turned around, weakens the effect of  asymmetric power structures.  
5. Conclusion 
Rather than letting participants play the normal form ultimatum game, based on monotonic acceptance 
strategies (responders choose acceptance thresholds), they were encountering normal form versions of  
concession ultimatum games varying in the maximal number of  possible concessions, horizon T=3 and T=5, 
and whether after a failed agreement attempt at least one concession is needed for a further attempt (C vs. N 
treatment). Compared to usual concession bargaining the innovative aspect is that conceding a lower acceptance 
threshold is not really a sacrifice for the responder (one only hypothetically accepts offers which before would 
have been rejected) whereas the proposer definitely would lose  when conceding leads to an agreement. 
How do results compare to usual (T=1) normal form ultimatum experiments? Regarding agreement ratios 
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the missing (significant) difference between T=3 and T=5, e.g. as very pronounced for C-treatments, suggest to 
extend our result to T=1, e.g. when comparing our findings to those of  Binmore et al. (2002) what, however, was 
rejected. The fact that conceding is possible at all seems to matter more that the number of  possible attempts. 
For the C treatment the longer horizon T=5 induced more frequent conflict due to neither party conceding after 
a failed attempt. Across trials, if  an agreement has been reached at all, the overwhelming agreement trial is the 
last one, in line with the so called deadline effect (see Figure 3).  
Regarding the fairness of  the final agreements the usual moderately lower share of  responder participants is 
confirmed. The pie of  the responder is, however, significantly higher in the C-treatment. One reason could be 
that proposers concede more often to prevent early conflict by which they would lose more than responders. 
This, however, is not supported by our data (see Result 4). In our view, responder participants concede more 
often across conditions since this means to substitute one (monotonic response) strategy by one which is weakly 
dominating it, i.e. conceding for them is no real sacrifice. 
Regarding the negotiation patterns, initial attempts are far more distant when concessions are needed (C-
treatment) what goes along with larger concessions for the C than for the N treatment. Since, compared to usual 
concession bargaining, the ultimatum game rules out anti-conflict (parties share less than available), concessions 
for the last trial t=T reveal systematic overshooting (see Figure 6), i.e. on average slightly smaller last concessions 
would also have led to an agreement. Interestingly there is no such average overshooting before the last trial T, 
irrespective of  horizon T, 3 versus 5, and treatment, N versus C. 
Finally we could demonstrate how heterogeneity in individual concession behavior in both rather different 
roles, proposer and responder, can be partly accounted for by one psychological characteristic, the post 
experimentally elicited index of  the Cognitive Reflection Test.  
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Appendix A. Personality tests 
As mentioned in text (3.5. Debriefing) subjects responded a debriefing questionnaire at the end of  each 
session that included a CRT test and Big Five personality inventory. 
A1. The Cognitive Reflection Test 
The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT, Frederick, 2005) is a three-item task that is meant to measure the 
tendency to override the first, apparently “intuitive, response alternative -that is incorrect- and to engage in 
further reflection that leads to the correct answer. This test  has been shown to be positively related with 
numerical literacy, mathematical skills, and to psychological dimensions related to impulsiveness (Morsanyi et al., 
2014; Toplak et al., 2011). 
CRT1.  A bat and a ball cost $1.10. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball 
cost? ￼ ___ cents. Correct Answer: 5.   
CRT2.  If  it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to 
make 100 widgets? _____ minutes. Correct Answer: 5. 
CRT3.  In a lake, there is a patch of  lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If  it takes 48 days for 
the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half  of  the lake?
_____ days. Correct Answer: 47. 
As Frederick (2005) points out, the beauty of  the test lies in the fact that “…The three items on the CRT are “easy” in 
the sense that their solution is easily understood when explained, yet reaching the correct answer often requires the suppression of  an 
erroneous answer that springs “impulsively” to mind.” (p. 27). In the test, these “erroneous answers” (100, 100 and 24, 
respectively) corresponds to the modal choices in our dataset (and in many others, see Frederick 2005).Following 
Frederick (2005), it is standard practice to use the CRT to build up an index -an integer from 0 to 3- by simply 
counting the number of  correct answers (see Brañas-Garza et al., 2012 and Grimm and Mengel, 2012).  
A2. The “Big 5” test 
The “Big 5” test of  psychological traits, in its various forms, is among the most relied-upon measures of  
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personality in psychology (see, e.g., Digman, 1990; John et al., 2008). It measures personality according to five 
broad dimensions, or “traits”, defined as 
• Openness: reflects the degree of  intellectual curiosity, creativity and a preference for novelty and 
variety a person has. It is also described as the extent to which a person is imaginative or 
independent, and depicts a personal preference for a variety of  activities over a strict routine. 
•  Conscientiousness: A tendency to be organized and dependable, show self-discipline, act dutifully, aim 
for achievement, and prefer planned rather than spontaneous behavior. 
• Extraversion:  Energy, positive emotions,  surgency, assertiveness, sociability and the tendency to 
seek stimulation in the company of  others, and talkativeness. 
• Agreeableness: A tendency to be compassionate and cooperative rather than suspicious and antagonic 
towards others. It is also a measure of  one´s trusting and helpful nature, and whether a person is 
generally well tempered or not.  
• Neuroticism: tendency to experience unpleasant emotions easily, such as  anger,  anxiety, depression, 
and  vulnerability. Also refers to the degree of  emotional stability and impulse control and is 
sometimes referred to by its low pole, "emotional stability". 
Recent studies (Borghans et al. 2009; Daly et al. 2009) show that these measures of  personality traits are a 
reliable predictor of  labor market performance and academic achievement (Barrick and Mount, 1991; Judge et al., 
1999; Heckman and Rubinstein, 2001; Zhao and Seibert, 2006; Heckman and LaFontaine, 2010). 
We implemented ii) as a control to be used in case of  unusual findings and thereby focus mainly on i). 
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Appendix B. Experimental instructions (translated from German) 
CONCESSIONS UG3R_NG3 
In this experiment you will be interacting with another participant whose identity will not be revealed by us. You 
will interact not only once but repeatedly with a randomly changing other participants. Each participant will 
constantly either assume role X or the other role Y. Both X and Y can potentially share … ECU. 
In role X the participant determines the amount y of  the total amount … which (s)he offers to the participant in 
role Y. In role Y the participant states the minimally acceptable amount y, i.e. in role Y one's choice of  y rejects 
offered amounts …-y smaller than y. For given choices y and y by X, respectively Y, an agreement would be 
reached if  … - y is at least as high as y. In that case the X-participant receives …-y and Y-participant the offer y 
which is at least as high as y. If  however y is smaller than y, the two participants have not agreed on how to share 
the total amount of  … ECU. 
To make it easier to find an agreement, the X-participant and the Y-participant do not state only one offer y, 
respectively one minimally acceptable amount y, but rather state three demands y1, y2, y3, which cannot decrease, 
respectively minimally acceptable amounts y1, y2, y3, which cannot increase. More specifically, it is required that 
 0 < y1 ≤ y2 ≤ y3 < … and 
0 < y3 ≤ y2 ≤ y1 < … 
where all these amounts are in ECU. How does this determine whether an agreement is reached and, if  so, which 
agreement how to share … is reached? This is determined as follows: 
• If  y1 ≥ y1, then an agreement is reached with X earning …- y1 and Y getting y1. 
• If  not one checks whether y2 ≥ y2. If  so, an agreement is reached with X earning …- y2 and Y getting y2. 
• If  not one checks whether y3 ≥ y3. If  so, an agreement is reached with X earning …- y3 and Y getting y3. 
• If  even y3 < y3, the two participants have not agreed. 
• With no agreement, X and Y earn nothing, i.e. the amount of  ... is lost for them. 
CONCESSIONS UG5R_NG5 
In this experiment you will be interacting with another participant whose identity will not be revealed by us. You 
will interact not only once but repeatedly with a randomly changing other participants. Each participant will 
constantly either assume role X or the other role Y. Both X and Y can potentially share … ECU. 
In role X the participant determines the amount y of  the total amount … which (s)he offers to the participant in 
role Y. In role Y the participant states the minimally acceptable amount y, i.e. in role Y one's choice of  y rejects 
offered amounts …-y smaller than y. For given choices y and y by X, respectively Y, an agreement would be 
reached if  … - y is at least as high as y. In that case the X-participant receives …-y and Y-participant the offer y 
which is at least as high as y. If  however y is smaller than y, the two participants have not agreed on how to share 
the total amount of  … ECU. 
To make it easier for X and Y to find an agreement, the X-participant and the Y-participant do not state only 
one offer y, respectively one minimally acceptable amount y, but rather state five demands y1, y2, y3, y4, y5, which 
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cannot decrease, respectively minimally acceptable amounts y1, y2, y3, y4, y5 which cannot increase. More 
specifically, it is required that 
 0 < y1 ≤ y2 ≤y3 ≤ y4 ≤ y5 < … and 
0 < y5 ≤ y4 ≤ y3 ≤ y2 ≤ y1 < … 
where all these amounts are in ECU. How does this determine whether an agreement is reached and, if  so, which 
agreement how to share … is reached? This is determined as follows: 
• If  y1 ≥ y1, then an agreement is reached with X earning …- y1 and Y getting y1. 
• If  not one checks whether y2 ≥ y2. If  so, an agreement is reached with X earning …- y2 and Y getting y2.  
• If  not one checks whether y3 ≥ y3. If  so, an agreement is reached with X earning …- y3 and Y getting y3. 
• If  not one checks whether y4 ≥ y4. If  so, an agreement is reached with X earning …- y4 and Y getting y4.  
• If  not one checks whether y5 ≥ y5. If  so, an agreement is reached with X earning …- y5 and Y getting y5. 
• If  even y5 < y5, the two participants have not agreed. 
• With no agreement, X and Y earn nothing, i.e. the amount of  ... is lost for them. 
CONCESSIONS UG3R_YG3 
In this experiment you will be interacting with another participant whose identity will not be revealed by us. You 
will interact not only once but repeatedly with a randomly changing other participants. Each participant will 
constantly either assume role X or the other role Y. Both X and Y can potentially share … ECU. 
In role X the participant determines the amount y of  the total amount … which (s)he offers to the participant in 
role Y. In role Y the participant states the minimally acceptable amount y, i.e. in role Y one's choice of  y rejects 
offered amounts …-y smaller than y. For given choices y and y by X, respectively Y, an agreement would be 
reached if  … - y is at least as high as y. In that case the X-participant receives …-y and Y-participant the offer y 
which is at least as high as y. If  however y is smaller than y, the two participants have not agreed on how to share 
the total amount of  … ECU. 
To make it easier to find an agreement, the X-participant and the Y-participant do not state only one offer y, 
respectively one minimally acceptable amount y, but rather state three demands y1, y2, y3, which cannot decrease, 
respectively minimally acceptable amounts y1, y2, y3, which cannot increase. More specifically, it is required that 
 0 < y1 ≤ y2 ≤ y3 < … and 
0 < y3 ≤ y2 ≤ y1 < … 
where all these amounts are in ECU. How does this determine whether an agreement is reached and, if  so, which 
agreement how to share … is reached? This is determined as follows: 
• If  y1 ≥ y1, then an agreement is reached with X earning …- y1 and Y getting y1. Otherwise, if  y2 + y2 = y1 
+ y1, no agreement has been reached. 
• However, if  y2 + y2 < y1 + y1, one checks whether y2 ≥ y2. If  so, an agreement is reached with X earning 
…- y2 and Y getting y2. Otherwise, if  y3 + y3 = y2 + y2, no agreement has been reached. 
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• However, if y3 + y3 < y2 + y2, one checks whether y3 ≥ y3. If  so, an agreement is reached with X earning 
…- y3 and Y getting y3. 
• If  even y3 < y3, the two participants have not agreed as in the no-agreement cases above. 
• With no agreement, X and Y earn nothing, i.e. the amount of  ... is lost for them. 
CONCESSIONS UG5R_YG5 
In this experiment you will be interacting with another participant whose identity will not be revealed by us. You 
will interact not only once but repeatedly with a randomly changing other participants. Each participant will 
constantly either assume role X or the other role Y. Both X and Y can potentially share … ECU. 
In role X the participant determines the amount y of  the total amount … which (s)he offers to the participant in 
role Y. In role Y the participant states the minimally acceptable amount y, i.e. in role Y one's choice of  y rejects 
offered amounts …-y smaller than y. For given choices y and y by X, respectively Y, an agreement would be 
reached if  … - y is at least as high as y. In that case the X-participant receives …-y and Y-participant the offer y 
which is at least as high as y. If  however y is smaller than y, the two participants have not agreed on how to share 
the total amount of  … ECU. 
To make it easier for X and Y to find an agreement, the X-participant and the Y-participant do not state only 
one offer y, respectively one minimally acceptable amount y, but rather state five demands y1, y2, y3, y4, y5, which 
cannot decrease, respectively minimally acceptable amounts y1, y2, y3, y4, y5 which cannot increase. More 
specifically, it is required that 
 0 < y1 ≤ y2 ≤y3 ≤ y4 ≤ y5 < … and 
0 < y5 ≤ y4 ≤ y3 ≤ y2 ≤ y1 < … 
where all these amounts are in ECU. How does this determine whether an agreement is reached and, if  so, which 
agreement how to share … is reached? This is determined as follows: 
• If  y1 ≥ y1, then an agreement is reached with X earning …- y1 and Y getting y1. Otherwise, if  y2 + y2 = y1 
+ y1, no agreement has been reached. 
• However, if  y2 + y2 < y1 + y1, one checks whether y2 ≥ y2. If  so, an agreement is reached with X earning 
…- y2 and Y getting y2. Otherwise, if  y3 + y3 = y2 + y2, no agreement has been reached. 
• However, if y3 + y3 < y2 + y2, one checks whether y3 ≥ y3. If  so, an agreement is reached with X earning 
…- y3 and Y getting y3. Otherwise, if  y4 + y4 = y3 + y3, no agreement has been reached. 
• However, if y4 + y4 < y3 + y3, one checks whether y4 ≥ y4. If  so, an agreement is reached with X earning 
…- y4 and Y getting y4. Otherwise, if  y5 + y5 = y4 + y4, no agreement has been reached. 
• However, if y5 + y5 < y4 + y4, one checks whether y5 ≥ y5. If  so, an agreement is reached with X earning 
…- y5 and Y getting y5. 
• If  even y5 < y5, the two participants have not agreed as in the no-agreement cases above. 
• With no agreement, X and Y earn nothing, i.e. the amount of  ... is lost for them.
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